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Abstract: Many recent proposals for anonymous com-
munication omit from their security analyses a consider-
ation of the effects of time on important system compo-
nents. In practice, many components of anonymity sys-
tems, such as the client location and network structure,
exhibit changes and patterns over time. In this paper,
we focus on the effect of such temporal dynamics on the
security of anonymity networks. We present Tempest, a
suite of novel attacks based on (1) client mobility, (2)
usage patterns, and (3) changes in the underlying net-
work routing. Using experimental analysis on real-world
datasets, we demonstrate that these temporal attacks
degrade user privacy across a wide range of anonymity
networks, including deployed systems such as Tor; path-
selection protocols for Tor such as DeNASA, TAPS, and
Counter-RAPTOR; and network-layer anonymity pro-
tocols for Internet routing such as Dovetail and HOR-
NET. The degradation is in some cases surprisingly se-
vere. For example, a single host failure or network route
change could quickly and with high certainty identify
the client’s ISP to a malicious host or ISP. The adver-
sary behind each attack is relatively weak — generally
passive and in control of one network location or a small
number of hosts. Our findings suggest that designers of
anonymity systems should rigorously consider the im-
pact of temporal dynamics when analyzing anonymity.
1 Introduction
Anonymous communication is a key privacy-enhancing
technology that aims to protect user identity in online
communications [5, 8, 19, 26, 29]. The most widely-used
anonymity protocol today is onion routing [26], which
in the form of the Tor network [19] is estimated to have
over 2 million users a day. The Tor network comprises
over 7,000 volunteer proxies, carries 100 Gbps of traf-
fic, and is widely used by citizens, journalists, whistle-
blowers, businesses, governments, law-enforcement, and
intelligence agencies [61, 63]. An important thread of
research has proposed new anonymity systems that im-
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prove on Tor in the context of network-level adversaries,
such as Autonomous Systems (ASes) that have vast vis-
ibility into Internet traffic. Systems such as DeNASA,
Astoria, TAPS, and Counter-RAPTOR have modified
path-selection algorithms for onion routing to mitigate
the threat of AS-level adversaries [4, 36, 50, 58]. Sys-
tems such as LAP, Dovetail, PHI, and HORNET have
moved cryptographic functionality for anonymous com-
munication from end hosts into the Internet routing in-
frastructure to improve performance [11, 12, 31, 56].
However, for simplicity of security analysis, design-
ers of these systems abstract away important compo-
nents of the system, which could impact user anonymity
in practice. In particular, one simplification commonly
used in the analysis of anonymity protocols is to limit
the effects of time on the operation of the protocol [1,
4, 31, 50, 56]. For example, security analyses typically
assume that each user communicates with a fixed desti-
nation once, that the set of participants in the protocol
is static, or that the network structure is static. The
question then arises: what are the effects of the tempo-
ral dimension of system operations on user anonymity?
Contributions. In this paper, we present Tem-
pest: a set of attacks that demonstrates the impact of
temporal dynamics on the security of several promi-
nent anonymity protocols. We target Tor and some of
the latest proposals for improving its security against
AS-level adversaries (namely, DeNASA [4], TAPS [36],
and Counter-RAPTOR [58]), as Tor has proven to be
the most popular protocol for the current Internet.
We also target proposals for network-layer anonymity
that represent the main ideas for providing anonymity
against AS-level adversaries in a next-generation Inter-
net (namely, Dovetail [56] and HORNET [11]).
We consider the vulnerability of such protocols
to deanonymization due to the effects on anonymous-
communication paths of three main types of temporal
dynamics: (1) client mobility, (2) user behavior over
multiple connections, and (3) network routing dynam-
ics. We consider especially a patient adversary that is
interested in performing long-term attacks on anony-
mous communication. Such an adversary is a real con-
cern of today’s Tor users [33, 38], for example those
avoiding mass surveillance. We propose and, using real-
world datasets, evaluate attacks that allow an adversary
to exploit long-term observations about anonymity path
changes for deanonymizing user identities.
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Table 1. This paper identifies and analyzes temporal dynamics (Tempest attacks) that degrade user privacy in anonymity systems,
including Tor, proposals for improving path selection in Tor (top half), and network-layer anonymity protocols (bottom half).
Exploiting Client Mobility Exploiting User Behavior Exploiting Routing Changes
Vanilla Tor [19] Novel (§5.2) Known [7, 30, 34, 38] Known [59]
DeNASA [4] Novel (§A.1) Novel (§6.1)
Counter-RAPTOR [58] Novel (§5.3) Novel (Resistance, §B.1) Known (Resistance) [58]
TAPS [36] Known (Resistance) [36] Novel (§7.1)
Astoria [50] Known [36]
HORNET [11] Novel (§5.4) Novel (§7.2)
Dovetail [56] Novel (§6.2)
PHI [12] Novel (§B.2)
LAP [31] Novel (implied by §5.4) Novel (implied by §7.2)
We find that Tempest attacks have significant im-
pact on the anonymity of these systems. One impact
that we show is that, in Tor-based systems, path changes
due to client mobility allow an increasing number of
AS-level adversaries to observe client traffic, compro-
mising client identity with a degree much greater than
previously thought possible. In network-level anonymity
systems, adversaries can also correlate partial informa-
tion about anonymity paths with auxiliary information
about client movements to deanonymize client identity.
Our work presents the first analysis of the impact of
path changes due to client mobility. Another impact
that we show is that path changes due to user behavior,
such as multiple connections to the same destination at
different times, and path changes due to network rout-
ing updates allow an adversary to combine probabilistic
information leaks inherent in path-selection algorithms
to deanonymize clients’ ASes over time. Note that in-
ferring the AS of a client represents a significant re-
duction in client anonymity (the typical anonymity set
comprises over 50,000 ASes without our attacks). Our
work is the first demonstration of how probabilistic in-
formation leaks due to the restricted AS-level Internet
topology can be aggregated over time.
Our results present a new evaluation paradigm for
important classes of anonymous-communication proto-
cols. They suggest that designers of anonymity systems
should thoroughly consider the impact of temporal dy-
namics when analyzing system security. Our work fur-
ther motivates the design of anonymous communication
protocols that are resilient when used over time and un-
der changing circumstances.
2 Overview of Tempest Attacks
In this section, we provide an overview of Tempest at-
tacks and summarize our key findings.
Exploiting Client Mobility. We demonstrate
how an adversary can exploit information leakage via
naturally-occurring real-world movements of clients.
Client mobility results in connections to anonymity net-
works appearing from different network locations over
time; we find that this enhances an adversary’s abil-
ity to perform traffic-analysis attacks and deanonymize
client communications. We experimentally quantify the
degradation in anonymity for Vanilla Tor (i.e. plain
Tor as it exists today), Counter-RAPTOR [58], and
HORNET [11] using real-world location datasets to
model client mobility. Across all studied systems, we
find that considering the effects of client mobility re-
sults in an order-of-magnitude degradation in client
anonymity: (1) for Vanilla Tor, client mobility in-
creases the exposure of the client-Tor communications
to AS-level adversaries, due to heterogeneous network
paths originating from varying client locations; (2) for
Counter-RAPTOR, client mobility increases an adver-
sary’s ability to actively manipulate BGP routing and
hijack/intercept client traffic to the anonymity network,
due to a fundamental mismatch in assumptions between
its location-aware path selection and the dynamics of
client mobility; and (3) for HORNET, client mobil-
ity results in changes in the network paths between a
client and its destination over time, which can be corre-
lated with external (non-anonymous) location datasets
to deanonymize the anonymity-network connections.
Exploiting User Behavior. We consider users
that regularly connect to a destination and demon-
strate how an adversary can take advantage of that to
deanonymize users in several prominent anonymity pro-
posals. Multiple user connections allow an adversary to
aggregate probabilistic information leakage from con-
nections over time and eventually deanonymize the user
by identifying his AS. We experimentally quantify this
degradation in anonymity over multiple connections for
DeNASA [4], a location-aware path selection algorithm
for Tor that avoids suspect ASes, and Dovetail [56], a
network-level anonymity protocol that uses a level of
indirection within Internet communications to provide
anonymity. We find that multiple connections have dev-
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astating consequences on user anonymity in DeNASA
and Dovetail. The path selection algorithms in both De-
NASA (focusing on the first-hop/guard relay) and Dove-
tail leak partial information about the client’s network
location, leading to a continual reduction in anonymity
as the client makes connections. The speed of this re-
duction is surprisingly fast for some unfortunate clients.
Exploiting Routing Changes. We show how
an adversary can exploit naturally-occurring routing
changes to compromise client anonymity. Similar to the
impact of client mobility, routing changes leak addi-
tional information to an adversary as they occur, which
can be aggregated over time to make accurate infer-
ences about client location. We experimentally quantify
the degradation in anonymity due to routing changes
for TAPS [36], a trust-aware path selection algorithm
for Tor, and HORNET [11]. For both TAPS and HOR-
NET, routing changes lead to varying anonymity sets
for clients over time, allowing an adversary to intersect
the anonymity sets at different points in time and infer
client network locations (client ASes).
Impact. The impact of the Tempest attacks is
summarized in Table 1. For each of the three tempo-
ral dynamics considered, we demonstrate attacks that
weaken security in at least one onion-routing proto-
col and one network-layer anonymity protocol. We note
that our results on exploiting client mobility repre-
sent the first analysis of this issue, to the best of our
knowledge, and we demonstrate its negative impact on
a range of systems. We also note that our results on
exploiting user behavior and routing changes include
several novel attacks across recently-proposed onion-
routing and network-layer anonymity protocols, sug-
gesting a significant re-evaluation of their effectiveness.
In particular, our work is the first to consider the ag-
gregation of probabilistic information leaks due to the
restricted AS-level Internet topology over time.
To highlight the broad impact of Tempest, Table 1
includes novel attacks that appear in the Appendix, in-
cluding exploiting client mobility in DeNASA, exploit-
ing user behavior in Counter-RAPTOR, and exploiting
user behavior in PHI (note that the results in the main
body of the paper are self-contained). Table 1 also in-
cludes entries for protocols not studied directly in this
work. It places into context an attack [36] on Astoria [50]
that is similar to our attacks exploiting user-behavior
dynamics. It also indicates that some of our attacks
should also be effective against LAP [31], as LAP re-
veals strictly more to the adversary about the source
and destination of a connection than HORNET does.
Due to the variety of systems considered, the Tem-
pest attacks vary in the kind of anonymity degradation
they achieve and in the adversary capabilities that they
require. In several cases we attack anonymity using the
same notions and metrics used to argue for the system’s
effectiveness by its designers. In every case, the adver-
saries we consider fall within the threat model stated for
the system under analysis. In addition, the adversaries
we consider are generally passive and need to control
only one or a small number of network entities (e.g. an
AS, a website, or a Tor relay). To summarize our con-
tributions, we identify the effects of temporal dynamics
on paths in anonymity systems as a general concern
affecting the anonymity of those systems. We present
the Tempest attacks and show that they can reduce
the anonymity of Tor, suggested Tor improvements, and
network-layer anonymity protocols.
3 Background
In this section, we present the required background on
Internet routing and anonymity protocols.
Network Routing. Routing in the Internet is
set up among routers via the Border Gateway Proto-
col (BGP). BGP produces routing paths between the
autonomous subnetworks that comprise the Internet,
called Autonomous Systems (ASes). There are roughly
58,000 ASes advertising routes on the Internet [14]. Each
AS is connected to at least one other AS, and the con-
nected ASes exchange traffic with each other in a va-
riety of bilateral relationships that specify when traffic
should be sent and how it is paid for. In BGP, routing
operates on variable-length IP prefixes, which are each
a sequence of bits that is compared to beginning of the
destination IP address to route a packet.
Onion Routing. Onion routing [26] achieves
anonymous communication online by encrypting the
network traffic and sending it through a sequence of
relays before going to the destination. The relays run at
the application layer on the hosts, and traffic between
each pair of hosts is routed using existing Internet rout-
ing protocols. To communicate, the client selects a se-
quence of relays, constructs a persistent circuit through
them, and uses it to establish a connection to the des-
tination. The circuit is constructed iteratively and is
encrypted once for every relay, which prevents each re-
lay from learning more than the previous and next hops,
and in particular it prevents any one relay or local net-
work observer from identifying both the source and des-
tination. Servers can remain anonymous by running as
hidden services, which maintain persistent circuits into
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the anonymity network through which they can be con-
tacted. Onion routing is well-known to be vulnerable to
a traffic correlation attack [60], however, in which an
adversary that observes both the client and the desti-
nation can deanonymize the connection by correlating
the traffic leaving the client with that entering the des-
tination.
Tor [19] is the most popular system implementing
onion routing. The Tor network currently consists of
over 7,000 relays cumulatively forwarding 100 Gbps of
traffic [61]. We will apply Tempest attacks to Tor as well
as to several recent proposals to improve Tor’s security
by changing the way that it selects paths: DeNASA [4],
TAPS [36], and Counter-RAPTOR [58]. These attacks
are likely to also be effective for other similar propos-
als [1, 3, 20, 37, 39, 50].
Network-Layer Anonymity Protocols. Onion
routing protocols are run at the application layer, which
allows them to be deployed without changes to the exist-
ing Internet. However, several protocols [11, 12, 31, 56]
propose operating at the network layer for efficiency and
ubiquity. These protocols change the way that routers
set up and route packets and thus require changes in
some of the core infrastructure of the Internet. Several
of them make use of some other next-generation rout-
ing algorithm (e.g. pathlets [25]) to propagate routing
information and select routing paths. These protocols
have many similarities with onion routing, and it is also
useful to view them through the temporal lens. We fo-
cus on two of these protocols, HORNET [11] and Dove-
tail [56], because they represent two distinct approaches
that have been suggested. As indicated in Table 1, our
results also imply vulnerability in the other network-
layer anonymity protocols.
4 Models and Metrics
The Tempest attacks each exploit some temporal dy-
namic, but they differ in where and how it is exploited.
An overview of the attack methods appears in Table 2.
Adversary Models. Motivated by mass-
surveillance concerns, we consider the context of a
patient adversary that is interested in performing long-
term deanonymization attacks. We consider several
different adversaries, depending on the system and the
way a temporal dynamic enables an attack. In each case
we identify a fairly weak adversary within the attacked
system’s threat model, with results in the following
threat models: a single AS, at least one Tor relay, and
the destination site. Our adversaries are generally pas-
sive, with the exceptions that we consider an active IP
prefix hijack (Section 5.3) and that active methods may
be used to link together connections as originating from
the same client.
In several of our attacks, we assume that the
adversary has this ability to link together multiple
connections (see Table 2). Observations at the Tor-
protocol level can allow circuits to be linked via tim-
ing [30, 32], but the application layer enables even more
effective linking in many important use cases, includ-
ing (1) a malicious website, which can either passively
observe pseudonymous logins or actively create link-
able connections [36]; (2) a public IRC channel, which
makes pseudonymous activity observable by any adver-
sary [34]; (3) a hidden service that a malicious client
can repeatedly connect to [51]; and (4) an administra-
tive service that only one entity has access to, such as
SSH access to a personal server, where such accesses
could be observed and recognized by a malicious ISP
hosting the server.
Anonymity Metrics. Due to the diversity of our
attacks, we use several types of metrics for their evalu-
ation (see Table 2 for each attack’s metric).
Probability of observing the client connection: In
some attacks, the adversary attempts to observe the
traffic between the client and the anonymity network.
Such observations can facilitate attacks like website fin-
gerprinting [28] and timing analysis [38]. We quantify
this attack as the probability that the adversary suc-
ceeds in observing the client connection.
Size of source anonymity set: In cases where the
adversary uses his observations to reduce the set of pos-
sible sources, we measure anonymity as the size of this
set [42]. The sources in our attacks are ASes.
Accuracy and rejection rate when guessing source:
Some attacks score possible sources heuristically and
then guess the highest-scoring source (sources are ASes
in our attacks). Because these methods aren’t perfect,
the guess may be wrong. However, we can recognize
when the scores are too low to make a confident guess
and reject making one. For this approach (multi-class
classification with the reject option [6]) we measure
anonymity using accuracy and rejection rate [49]. Ac-
curacy is the fraction of correct guesses among cases in
which a guess is made, and rejection rate is the fraction
of cases in which no guess was made.
Entropy of source distribution: When the adver-
sary’s observations allow him to perform Bayesian in-
ference on the source, we measure anonymity as the
entropy of the posterior distribution [57]. Our distri-
butions are over ASes, and we use a uniform prior.
Bayesian inference is a strong deanonymization tech-
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Table 2. Overview of Tempest attacks showing the attacked system, adversary capabilities, attack goal, and evaluation metric.
System Adversary Supporting Capabilities Attack Goal Metric
§5.2 Vanilla Tor Single AS Observe client
directly
Probability of observing
client-guard connection
§5.3 Counter-
RAPTOR
Single AS BGP hijack Observe client
directly
Probability of hijacking
client-guard connection
§5.4 HORNET Destination AS Links client connections
Has identified mobility dataset
Link pseudonym to
real-world identity
Accuracy and rejection rate
when guessing client identity
§6.1 DeNASA Some Tor relays Links client connections Identify client AS Entropy of posterior
distribution over ASes
§6.2 Dovetail Single AS Links client connections Identify client AS Set size of possible client ASes
§7.1 TAPS Destination
website
Induces linkable circuits
Performs guard discovery
Identify client AS Set size of possible client ASes
§7.2 HORNET Destination AS Tracks connection across
routing change
Identify client AS Set size of possible client ASes
§A.1 DeNASA Single AS Observe client
directly
Probability of observing
client-guard connection
§B.1 Counter-
RAPTOR
Some Tor relays Links client connections Identify client AS Entropy of posterior
distribution over ASes
§B.2 PHI Single AS Links client connections Identify client AS Accuracy and rejection rate
when guessing client AS
nique, but it is not feasible for all attacks (e.g. due to
computational constraints), which prevents us from us-
ing this metric in many cases it might otherwise apply.
Note that many of our metrics measure anonymity
of the client AS. Although a single AS may serve
many thousands of clients, an attack that identifies
the client AS is still quite dangerous, as (1) the client
AS can be targeted to divulge the user’s real iden-
tity (such targeting would likely be necessary for real-
world deanonymization even if the client’s IP address
were known); (2) the diversity of user attributes (e.g.
physical location) is much lower within a client AS and
may combine well with auxiliary knowledge; and (3) the
client AS can be used to link connections and build a
pseudonymous profile. Indeed, a main challenge in de-
signing network-layer anonymity protocols is hiding the
client AS, as the IP address can be easily hidden by the
client AS using Network Address Translation.
In several analyses, we focus on the anonymity of
the users against whom the attack is most successful,
such as those in locations that experience the largest
anonymity losses. The vulnerability of such users to
deanonymization is important to consider, as (1) users
don’t benefit equally from anonymity, and the most vul-
nerable users may suffer the most from deanonymiza-
tion; (2) even if a minority of users will end up being
deanonymized, that small risk may be too high for a
majority of users, who thus cannot use the system; and
(3) relatively few deanonymizations may erode overall
trust in the system given the difficulty of communicat-
ing inconsistent anonymity guarantees.
Network Model. To model Internet routing, we
generally infer an AS-level topology. We infer AS paths
using the algorithm proposed by Mao et al. [43], which
searches for shortest valley-free paths that respect lo-
cal preference for different economic relationships (e.g.
customer, provider, peer). While this type of inference
isn’t perfect [24], it is used in the original evaluations
of all the recently-proposed anonymity systems that we
study (Tor, being an older design, originally omitted any
network-level analysis at all but has since been evalu-
ated using traceroute data [40]). This is true even for
those systems (HORNET, Dovetail) that do not work
with BGP, which are evaluated using the existing Inter-
net topology under the supposition that a future Inter-
net would have similar topological properties.
5 Client Mobility
We demonstrate how an adversary can exploit infor-
mation leakage from client movements to deanonymize
client communications. As clients connect to anonymity
networks from various network locations, they expose
themselves to more adversaries and leak location data
that will enable adversaries to deanonymize them. We
experimentally quantify the effectiveness of such attacks
for Vanilla Tor, Counter-RAPTOR, and HORNET us-
ing real-world Foursquare and Gowalla data to model
client mobility. We also present supplemental results for
DeNASA in Appendix A.1.
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Table 3. Number of users with country-level movements and
number of days to complete the movements in Foursquare (F)
and Gowalla (G) datasets.
Num. Countries 2 3 4 5 6 ≥ 7
Users F 40145 13179 5649 2708 1490 2574
Users G 17884 4557 1694 705 305 299
Q1 Days F 48 120 195 228 248 245
Q1 Days G 7 31 56 77 103 125
Med. Days F 144 252 301 331 353 364
Med. Days G 24 71 111 135 160 177
5.1 Mobility Dataset
We explored two datasets to model client movements: a
Gowalla Dataset [13] and a Foursquare Dataset [66, 67].
The datasets contain location data from real users over
the periods Feb 2009–Oct 2010 and Apr 2012–Sep 2013,
respectively. We focus on the country-level movements
of users and use it as a proxy for network movements, as
we lack fine-grained data to model AS-level movements.
Table 3 compares the two datasets in terms of num-
bers of users with distinct country-level movements.
Note that we only count new countries in the number
of countries visited, i.e., if a user moves out of a coun-
try and later travels back, we do not recount it. The
table also shows the Quartile 1 (Q1) and median num-
ber of days it takes to visit each number of countries in
both datasets. The median time may take months due
to some infrequent travelers, but there are some clients
who visit several countries in less than a month. We
also notice that the Foursquare dataset shows a higher
Q1/median number of days, indicating that Foursquare
users travel less frequently than Gowalla users. How-
ever, given the large number of Foursquare users, the
absolute number of users for a given travel frequency is
similar between the two datasets.
For our analysis in this section, we use both the
Foursquare and Gowalla datasets to model client move-
ments. We use two datasets to map each country to
a “possible” AS that a user may connect from in that
country: (1) for evaluations on the Tor network, we use
Juen’s top Tor client ASes dataset [39] to map the coun-
try to the top Tor client AS located in that country, and
(2) for network-layer anonymity protocols, we use the
top Internet Service Provider per country (based on the
number of active IP addresses) [15].
5.2 Vanilla Tor
Protocol. A Tor circuit typically consists of three hops.
Clients choose a small set of relays (the default number
is one) called guards that are used as the first hop in ev-
ery circuit. A client will attempt to use the same guard
for four to five months before choosing new guards, but
this rate is often accelerated because a client is forced to
choose a new guard if its guard goes offline. To balance
the traffic load, Tor relays are chosen by clients with
probability proportional to their bandwidth.
Attack. We quantify the probability that, as a
client moves, an adversary is able to observe the client’s
Tor traffic from the critical position between the client
and its guard. Such a position allows the adversary to
observe the client IP address and thus to perform web-
site fingerprinting [28], to locate hidden services [51],
and to deanonymize via traffic correlation when des-
tination observations are also available [38]. This po-
sition is so sensitive that Tor developed entry guards
specifically to make it difficult to observe. We consider
a passive adversary controlling a single AS whose goal
is to be on-path between a client and its guard relay
at some point in time. As a client moves to new loca-
tions while still using the same guard relay chosen at the
initial location, an AS-level adversary will have increas-
ing probabilities to observe the client-guard connection.
Note that, although we suppose that the client uses the
same guard across movements (e.g. by using Tor on a
laptop), a similar increase in client-guard traffic expo-
sure occurs if the client uses a different Tor instance at
each new location.
Methodology. We obtain Tor network data from
CollecTor [62]. We use a Tor relay consensus file from
1 Oct 2016 and retrieve relevant data fields from each re-
lay entry, such as guard flag, bandwidth, and IP address.
We map IP addresses to ASes using Route Views prefix-
to-AS mappings [55]. We use CAIDA’s Internet topol-
ogy [10] with inferred AS relationships from Oct 2016.
We use the same data to model Tor and Internet routing
throughout the paper unless otherwise noted.
We evaluate the CAIDA top 50 ASes [9] as poten-
tial adversaries which include all Tier 1 ASes. We choose
the top 50 ASes to evaluate because they are large In-
ternet service providers that carry a significant amount
of network traffic, and thus they are at a good position
to observe client-guard connections (we did also con-
sider the attack from all ASes and observed a similar
increase in probability). We measure the probability of
these ASes to be on-path in the client-guard connection
at least once during the client’s movements. We assume
that the client connects to the Tor network at least once
in each country. For a given client and for each guard,
we use AS path inference to determine if an adversary
AS is on-path at the client’s current and previous lo-
cations. We then compute the probability by weighting
across the guards’ bandwidth.
Results. Figure 1 shows the probability of compro-
mising a client-guard connection in Vanilla Tor, aver-
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Fig. 1. Probability of compromising a client-guard connection
in Vanilla Tor, averaged over the top 50 ASes, with the line
showing the median and shaded area showing values within
[Q1 − 1.5 IQR, Q3 + 1.5 IQR].
aged over the top 50 ASes. Each point on the line shows
the median attack probability over clients with a given
number of country-level movements. The shaded area
shows values between [Q1 − 1.5 IQR, Q3 + 1.5 IQR],
where Q1 and Q3 are Quartile 1 and Quartile 3, re-
spectively, and IQR, the interquartile range, is defined
as Q3 − Q1. This is a standard way to exclude out-
liers. Initially, the median probability is 2.8% with no
movement (1 country). With two more movements (3
countries), the median probability already doubles for
both datasets. The probability can reach over 25% for
the clients who have visited 14 countries or more, which
is nearly 9 times more than the baseline (1 country, no
movement). The median probability decreases slightly
after 20 country movements in the Gowalla dataset (23
in Foursquare dataset). This is due to the small sam-
ple of users with high numbers of movements in the
datasets, causing higher variance. For instance, there is
only one Gowalla user that has visited 20 countries, and
thus the last data point reflects the probability of only
that user. Overall, the probability of an adversarial AS
compromising a client-guard connection significantly in-
creases during country-level movements.
5.3 Counter-RAPTOR
Protocol. Counter-RAPTOR [58] improves Tor’s se-
curity against BGP hijacks [59] by changing the way
that guards are chosen. For each guard Gi, a client cal-
culates a resilience value Ri that estimates the fraction
of Internet ASes that wouldn’t succeed in hijacking the
client’s traffic to Gi by (falsely) claiming to be the ori-
gin AS of the IP prefix containing Gi. The guard relay
selection algorithm combines the resilience value Ri and
the bandwidth of the guard Gi by a configurable param-
eter α in order to take into account both the resilience
to hijack attacks and load balancing.
Attack.We consider an adversary controlling a sin-
gle AS whose goal is to observe the sensitive client-guard
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Fig. 2. Probability of succeeding in at least one hijack in
Counter-RAPTOR, averaged over the top 50 ASes, with the
line showing the median and shaded area showing values within
[Q1 − 1.5 IQR, Q3 + 1.5 IQR].
traffic (as in Section 5.2) via a BGP hijack of the guard’s
prefix. Counter-RAPTOR aims to maximize Tor clients’
resiliencies to hijack attacks by choosing a guard relay
based on client location. However, the guard selection is
done based on the client’s initial location, and the same
guard is used for several months even though the clients
may move across locations. Thus, AS-level adversaries
have an increased power for succeeding in a hijack at-
tack when clients move to new locations because the
guard is only optimized for the initial location.
Methodology. We evaluate the CAIDA top 50
ASes [9] as potential adversaries. We measure the prob-
ability of these ASes to succeed in at least one hijack
attack during the client’s movements. Note that a suc-
cessful hijack attack allows the adversary to observe
the traffic between client and guard, enabling the traffic
analysis attacks discussed in Section 5.2. For each client
and each guard, we use AS path inference to determine
if an adversary AS can succeed in a hijack attack on
the guard. We then compute the attack probability by
weighting across the bandwidth of the guards.
Results. Figure 2 shows the probability of succeed-
ing at least one hijack attack on the client’s guard, av-
eraged over the top 50 ASes. Each point on the line
shows the median value over clients with a given num-
ber of country-level movements. The shaded area shows
values in the range [Q1 − 1.5 IQR, Q3 + 1.5 IQR]. We
can see that the median probability of hijack success
reaches about 68% with only one movement (2 coun-
tries) for both datasets, compared to an initial of 58%
and 50%, respectively, with no movement (1 country).
When the number of movements is more than 10 coun-
tries, the attack probability can reach over 90%. The
median probability decreases slightly when the number
of countries reaches more than 12 in the Gowalla dataset
due to the same reason as in Figure 1; when the number
of movements increases, there are fewer users resulting
in higher variance. Overall, our analysis shows that the
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probability of hijack success can quickly increase with
only very few client movements.
5.4 HORNET
Protocol. HORNET [11] (short for High-speed Onion
Routing at the NETwork layer) provides similar privacy
guarantees as onion routing but operates at the network
layer. HORNET builds on routing protocols in which
the source can obtain potential routing paths to the
destination. Each router cryptographically modifies the
full packet (i.e. headers and payload) such that each AS
on-path between a source and destination can identify
only its previous and next AS hops. HORNET’s stated
threat model is an adversary who compromises a frac-
tion of ASes, possibly including the destination AS.
Attack. Our attack on HORNET exploits infor-
mation leakage via auxiliary information about client
movements patterns. The threat model for this attack
is an adversary who compromises the destination AS.
The adversary wants to deanonymize clients who use a
service hosted within the destination AS, e.g. an AS who
provides cloud services wants to find the true identities
of pseudonymous accounts on a video streaming website
hosted in its cloud. The clients’ identities are protected
by HORNET when logging into their pseudonymous ac-
counts on the destination website. At the same time, the
clients may reveal their identities and locations via aux-
iliary channels. For instance, researchers, activists, and
politicians who frequently travel to different countries
and give public speeches expose both their identities and
locations. Users may also check in using location-aware
services such as Foursquare and Yelp that publicly re-
veal that information. Identified user movements may
also be collected by a cellular provider and shared with
the website for commercial purposes or with a common
legal authority. Note that the auxiliary location infor-
mation is not directly linkable to the users’ accounts on
the destination website.
The adversary AS has access to two sets of data: (1)
pseudonymous accounts of its clients and the preceding
hop in the AS path from the clients to the destination
AS; (2) auxiliary information that contain real identities
of people and their location data.
The adversary’s goal is to link the two datasets and
connect the real identities to the pseudonymous activi-
ties of the clients. The intuition is that the penultimate
hop used to reach the destination AS depends on the
location of the client. With dataset (1), the adversary
can identify a set of possible client locations for each
connection to a pseudonymous account by considering
which locations could choose a path to the destination
through the observed penultimate AS hop. Then, with
dataset (2), the adversary can examine the location data
of identified users and ask the question: which identi-
ties were in one of the possible locations for the connec-
tion? This anonymity set could be quite large if only one
pseudonymous connection is considered, but by linking
many connections over time the adversary can derive
new information when a client moves to new location
and thus shrink the client’s anonymity set.
Methodology. As described in Section 5.1, we use
the Foursquare and Gowalla datasets as auxiliary infor-
mation that reveal real client identities and their loca-
tions. We map each client geo-location to the AS of the
top Internet Service Provider that offers service in the
country of the geo-location. Before any location infor-
mation, each client’s anonymity set comprises the en-
tire population of 107,061 Gowalla users and 266,909
Foursquare users, respectively. We then consider loca-
tion data points at a daily granularity. We assume the
clients have daily connections to the destination. For
each day, we take all the clients with location data and
compute the penultimate AS hops given their mapped
source ASes. Then, for each client, we can eliminate all
the other clients without the same penultimate AS hop
from its anonymity set. Given the imperfect auxiliary
information (not all clients have location data every-
day), we only eliminate clients with location data the
same day, and assume that the clients who do not have
data can be at any arbitrary location and thus do not
eliminate them from any anonymity set.
After processing all location data from the dataset,
we rank the remaining candidates in each client’s
anonymity set based on their total number of location
data points, from highest to lowest. The intuition is that
we want to place more confidence in the clients who re-
veal their locations frequently and thus provide more
identifying information. We also assign a weight value
to each candidate i as ea∗Ni , where a = 0.1 and Ni is the
number of location data points of candidate i. The value
of a was chosen based on the distribution of number of
location data points to scale down the numerical values.
Then, for each candidate, we compute the weight ratio
of its weight over the sum of all candidates’ weights in
the given client’s anonymity set.
Next, we focus only on the highest-weight candi-
date in each anonymity set. If the weight ratio of the
highest-ranked candidate is above a threshold, then we
will guess this candidate as the source; otherwise, we
“reject” the input (i.e. do not guess) due to a lack of con-
fidence. Note that we allow a single client to have multi-
ple pseudonymous accounts on the destination website,
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Fig. 3. Accuracy rates for HORNET deanonymizations with in-
crease in number of location data points at various rejection rates
(R.R.) for Gowalla (G) and Foursquare (F) datasets.
as we may guess the same candidate for multiple client
accounts in the above process.
We evaluate the accuracy rates vs. the number of
location data points with fixed rejection rate [49] to
show the effectiveness of the attack. Accuracy rate is
computed as the number of correct guesses over the to-
tal number of guesses, and rejection rate is computed
as the number of non-guesses over the total number of
pseudonymous accounts.
Results. We present the results for destination
Fastly (AS541130), which is a CDN provider for red-
dit.com and many other websites. We also evaluate
other popular sites measured by Alexa [2] such as
Google (AS15169), Facebook (AS32934), and Twitter
(AS13414), the results for which show similar patterns
and appear in Appendix A.2. We evaluate clients for
which we have sufficient location information, which, in
this case, are the clients with at least 100 location data
points in the datasets (there are 50,566 such clients in
Foursquare and 4,645 in Gowalla). Figure 3 illustrates
the results for fixed rejection rates of 80% and 90%,
respectively, for both datasets. For each data point,
we bucket clients using increments of 50 location data
points. For clients with more than 400 location data
points, we group them all together since there are many
fewer clients. We can see that the accuracy rate quickly
increases with the number of location data points. For
Gowalla users, with 200 location data points or more,
the accuracy rate reaches 100% with rejection rate at
90%, meaning that the adversary can deanonymize 10%
of the clients with no false positives. With lower rejec-
tion rate at 80%, the accuracy rate eventually reaches
100% as well for clients with 300 location data points or
more. For Foursquare users, the accuracy rate reaches
97% at 90% rejection rate with 300 location data points
or more, and reaches 100% with 350 location data points
or more for both rejection rates. The difference between
the two datasets can be due to the frequency of client
movements, e.g., a client with 300 data points of the
same location may not reveal that much information
compared to a client with 300 data points spread across
10 different countries. From Table 3, we can see that
Foursquare users travel less frequently than Gowalla
users.
5.5 Summary
We show that client mobility can expose new vulnera-
bilities that put mobile clients at risk. For Vanilla Tor,
client mobility increases the probability that an AS-
level adversary can observe the traffic between clients
and guards; for Counter-RAPTOR, client mobility in-
creases the probability of succeeding in routing attacks;
for HORNET, client mobility makes it very effective and
accurate to deanonymize clients that reveal a sufficient
amount of location information.
6 User Behavior
In some of the anonymity systems that we study, clients
leak partial information about their network location
through observable parts of their anonymity paths. If an
adversary learns such information from a single connec-
tion, then an adversary that can link multiple connec-
tions as originating from the same client may learn in-
creasing amounts of information. In this section, we at-
tack two protocols, DeNASA and Dovetail, with an ad-
versary who links together observations over time. Ad-
ditionally, we refer an interested reader to Appendices
B.1 and B.2, where we provide supplemental results ex-
ploring how our Tempest attacks can be extended to
two similar systems: Counter-RAPTOR and PHI.
6.1 DeNASA
Protocol. DeNASA [4] is a proposal to improve Tor’s
security by modifying how relays are selected for cir-
cuits. It is designed to prevent deanonymization via traf-
fic correlation by a small number of Suspect ASes, that
is, ASes that appear frequently on paths to or from the
Tor network. In the DeNASA guard-selection algorithm
g-select, clients make a bandwidth-weighted choice of
guard only from among relays that are suspect-free. A
suspect-free relay is defined as a relay such that neither
of the top two Suspect ASes appear on the network path
between the client and the relay. Suspect ASes are glob-
ally ranked in descending order of how often they are in
a position to perform traffic correlation on Tor circuits.
Attack. The subset of suspect-free relays available
to a client varies depending on the client ISP’s Inter-
net links and routing policies. Because of this variation
across client locations, clients in different locations will
often select the same guard with differing probabilities.
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Thus, a guard selection leaks some location information;
an adversary who can identify a client’s guard can at-
tempt to infer the client’s location by considering guard
selection likelihoods from various locations. In this Tem-
pest attack, we demonstrate that multiple guard selec-
tions, identified by the adversary over time as belonging
to the same client, can leak enough information to re-
veal the client’s AS. Recall that identifying the client’s
AS is a serious degradation of anonymity (Section 4).
To run this attack, the adversary runs some Tor re-
lays. The malicious relays will occasionally be used for
a client’s circuits, allowing the adversary to discover the
client’s guards over time [65]. The adversary may also
employ other known guard discovery attacks [22, 45].
We suppose that the adversary is able to link together
a client’s connections over time using the methods de-
scribed in Section 4, which can all be accomplished by
an adversary running relays. Having identified guards
(G1, . . . , Gn) used by the same client over time, the
adversary performs Bayesian inference to compute the
posterior probability Pr(L | G1, . . . , Gn) for each possi-
ble client location L. The adversary uses whatever prior
belief he has about the client location (we use a uni-
form prior). Clients use public routing data to identify
suspect-free relays, and so the adversary can compute
the guard-selection distributions for all client locations
needed to compute the posterior distribution over loca-
tions. Increasing numbers of identified guards reduces
the uncertainty in this posterior distribution and can
effectively reveal the client location.
Methodology. We analyze this information leak-
age over multiple guard selections by simulating De-
NASA’s g-select algorithm using our network model
(Section 4). We identify a maximal connected compo-
nent containing 55,244 ASes in the graph generated from
our AS path inference to use as Tor client locations;
we restrict our analysis to a clique to prevent inaccu-
racies arising from missing edges in the inferred graph.
For each of these client ASes, we compute the suspect-
free guard selection distribution that clients inside these
ASes will use to choose guards. Following Barton et al.
[4], we use AS1299 (Telia Company) and AS3356 (Level
3) as the suspect ASes that clients try to avoid.
Since the adversary performs Bayesian inference in
this attack, we use the entropy of the adversary’s pos-
terior distribution over client locations as our measure
of client anonymity. We employ a number of heuristics
to search for worst-case “leaky” client ASes from which
guard selections reveal location information quickly; for
example, one heuristic ranks client ASes in ascending
order by the mean entropy of the adversary’s posterior
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Fig. 4. Mean entropy of posterior client-AS distribution of De-
NASA g-select clients in “leaky” ASes after x guard observations.
distribution after a single guard selection is made (av-
eraged over guards). We select the top ten leaky client
ASes identified by our heuristics to evaluate.
For each of these ten client ASes, we simulate a
client inside the AS making guard selections (with re-
placement). We compute the likelihood that these se-
lections were made by a client in each of the possible
55,244 client ASes. From these likelihoods, we generate
the adversary’s posterior distribution over all possible
client locations using a uniform prior. We perform this
simulation 100 times for each of the ten client ASes.
Results. In Figure 4 we show the entropy of
this posterior location probability distribution, averaged
across the samples, for each client AS at varying number
of guard observations. For visual clarity, we only present
four of the evaluated ASes (the other six ASes exhibit
similar or identical trends). After two observed guard
selections, clients from all ten ASes drop below 4 bits of
entropy. After three observations, the median entropy
for these ASes drops to just 1 bit. Observe how multiple
observations combine to cause dramatic reductions in
anonymity. For example, after a single guard selection
observation, clients in AS199348 only lose an average of
1.34 bits of entropy; however, a second observation, in
combination with the first, yields a substantial loss of
13.26 bits and depletes nearly all of the client’s entropy.
A client is forced to select two or more guards quickly
(e.g. in hours or days) if his guards go offline and is
guaranteed to select a new guard every few months.
6.2 Dovetail
Protocol. Dovetail [56] is a network-layer anonymity
protocol designed for networks that support source-
controlled routing. In Dovetail, a source host S builds
a route to a destination host D using overlapping head
and tail path segments to and from a matchmaker AS
M , which is chosen randomly from a set of available
matchmaker ASes. S builds the head path segment to
M and encrypts D’s identity toM . S andM coordinate
to choose and build the tail segment toD such that head
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and tail path segments intersect at a common AS, X,
called the dovetail. After X removes the loop to the
matchmaker, the final path used for communication is
S ; X ; D. ASes on a Dovetail path learn: (1) the
identities of their immediate predecessor and successor
ASes on the path, (2) their absolute position in a path
(e.g. first hop, second hop, etc.), and (3) the host/AS
at the end of their path segment (ASes on the head seg-
ment learn M ’s identity, ASes on the tail segment learn
D’s identity, and X learns both M and D’s identity).
In source-controlled routing, a client chooses the AS
path used for his connections from a subset of paths
made available by his ISP — we call this path subset
routable paths. To build a Dovetail connection, a client
randomly chooses a head path segment from among
his routable paths containing six or more ASes to the
matchmaker; the dovetail is chosen to be the second-to-
last AS on the head path segment. The details of tail
path selection are unimportant for this attack.
Attack. To reiterate, a client is limited to select
a head path segment to the matchmaker from among
routable paths; the availability of routable paths varies
depending upon the client’s ISP, and so path usage
inherently leaks location information. If the adversary
compromises the kth AS on a path, then he can narrow
down the client’s location by considering the set of ASes
that could have created a path of length (k − 1) to the
predecessor AS P in the path.
With our Tempest attack, we demonstrate that this
leakage is greatly exacerbated if a single Dovetail client
makes many connections. Suppose the adversary con-
trols an AS that monitors connections passing through
his AS, a scenario that is within Dovetail’s stated threat
model. We require that the adversary links together con-
nections as originating from the same client (e.g. using a
method described in Section 4). The adversary will use
his path observations when he happens to be chosen in
the dovetail position because this position is the closest
to the source that also learns the connection’s destina-
tion, which facilitates the connection-linking required
for this attack. Suppose the adversary makes observa-
tions {(P1, k1), . . . , (Pn, kn)} with respect to a client,
where (Pi, ki) denotes the adversary’s predecessor and
absolute position on the ith connection on which he is
in the dovetail position; then, the adversary can com-
pute the set of possible client locations as ∩ni=1L(Pi, ki)
where L maps a predecessor P and position k to the set
of client locations that can create a path of length (k−1)
to P . The output of this attack is a possibility set over
client locations, in contrast to the probability distribu-
tion over client locations obtained by the adversary in
the Section 6.1 attack; computing the observation like-
lihoods required for Bayesian inference is computation-
ally expensive given Dovetail’s route selection scheme.
Methodology. We run our attack in a simulated
Dovetail network with paths inferred from CAIDA’s In-
ternet topology. We follow Sankey and Wright and use
a network model in which a client can route a connec-
tion through any valley-free AS path between the source
and destination with at most one peer-to-peer link. ASes
without customer ASes act as possible client ISPs in this
analysis; there are 47,052 such ASes in the topology.
Dovetail Frequency. We assume the adversary com-
promises a single, fixed AS; as such, interesting ASes to
consider as compromised are ones that are selected of-
ten as a dovetail. We run simulations to determine ASes
that are likely to be selected to serve as the dovetail. In
each simulation, a source AS and matchmaker AS are
chosen uniformly at random from among all client ISP
ASes and all ASes, respectively. Then, we simulate a
client in the source AS who builds a path to the match-
maker AS and record the dovetail AS. We collect sam-
ples by repeating this procedure 10,000 times and choose
as our adversarial AS the most-common dovetail.
Anonymity Evaluation. We run simulations to mea-
sure the efficacy of this attack with respect to the fixed
adversarial AS. In each simulation, we choose a source
AS uniformly at random from among all client ISP ASes
and choose 500 ASes uniformly at random from among
all ASes to serve as matchmaker ASes. Then, we sim-
ulate a client in the source AS who makes up to 100
repeated connections to the same destination (the des-
tination location is irrelevant for this analysis). For each
connection, the client chooses a matchmaker AS uni-
formly at random from among the 500 possible and
builds a path to the matchmaker. If the fixed adver-
sarial AS happens to be placed in the dovetail position
on this path, the adversary observes his predecessor AS
in the path and his ordinal position in the path. The
adversary then computes the set of all ASes who could
have constructed a path of observed length to his prede-
cessor and, through intersection, updates his set of pos-
sible client locations maintained persistently for the en-
tire simulation (initially containing all 47,052 client ISP
ASes). If the adversary is not selected as the dovetail
for a connection, he simply takes no action. We record
the size of the possible client location set after each of
the 100 source-matchmaker paths are constructed. We
collect samples by repeating this procedure 500 times.
Results. Dovetail Frequency. AS1299 (Telia Com-
pany) is selected most frequently as the dovetail AS,
used in 4.03% of all samples. The distribution is very
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centile of the samples’ anonymity set sizes.
right-skewed — although 1,005 unique ASes are selected
as dovetail at least once, the top ten ASes of the distri-
bution are used as the dovetail in 30.73% of all samples.
Anonymity Evaluation. Because AS1299 was se-
lected as the dovetail most frequently in our frequency
analysis, we use it as our fixed adversarial AS. We
also ran experiments for the other nine most-frequently-
selected dovetail ASes and find that they all produce
similar results. Figure 5 plots the number of ASes in
the source’s anonymity set after x repeated connections.
Each line corresponds to a percentile; for example, the
point at (x = 100, y = 126) in the “5th” percentile indi-
cates that, after 100 connections, AS1299 could rule out
all but 126 possible source ASes in 5% of samples. This
attack yields significant anonymity reductions in many
of our samples. After 10 repeated connections, in 5% of
samples, our adversary can rule out all but 5,100 source
ASes as possible — a 90% reduction in anonymity set
size. By 100 repeated connections, the 5th percentile
across samples is reduced by 99.7%.
These results exhibit a continual reduction in
anonymity as the client make connections, suggesting
that clients who make many connections place them-
selves at a high risk for deanonymization. A client
could make hundreds of repeated connections over a few
days/weeks if he is a frequent user of some Internet ser-
vice. We find that each of the ten most frequently se-
lected dovetail ASes are strong vantage points for this
attack. Many of these ASes are Tier 1 or large transit
networks; such ASes are naturally of interest to many
adversaries and are high value targets for compromise.
6.3 Summary
For both the DeNASA and Dovetail protocols, we
demonstrate serious weaknesses to an adversary who
can link observations together. We emphasize that the
significant anonymity degradation in our findings occurs
only after a client makes multiple connections, whereas
prior work has focused on quantifying anonymity after
a single observed connection.
7 Routing Changes
Natural Internet routing dynamics can change the net-
work paths between hosts in an anonymity system. In
this section, we show how an adversary can use such
route changes to deanonymize users of two systems:
TAPS and HORNET.
7.1 TAPS
Protocol. Trust-Aware Path Selection (TAPS) [36] pro-
poses to improve Tor’s resistance to traffic-correlation
attacks by choosing circuits based on the trust that
a client has in different network components. TAPS
models a trust belief as per-adversary probability dis-
tributions that describe the likelihood that relays and
network paths between relays are under observation by
each adversary. Because different client locations use dif-
ferent network paths, TAPS leaks information about the
client’s location through how the client chooses its cir-
cuits’ relays. To limit this leakage, TAPS clusters client
locations around a fixed set of representative locations,
and then each client chooses circuits as if it were in its
cluster’s representative location. The clustering routine
is informed by a static snapshot of the state of the net-
work at the time of cluster generation. This snapshot
contains information about the entities in the trust be-
lief, such as the Tor relays and the ASes. Importantly,
it includes inferred AS-level routing paths. Because the
state of the network changes over time, Johnson et al.
state that clusters should be reformed periodically.
Attack. There exists a significant temporal issue
with the TAPS clustering process: a client’s circuit-
construction behavior may reveal his cluster, a client’s
cluster may change across cluster reformations, and the
adversary can intersect those clusters to gradually re-
veal the client’s location. The TAPS AS-to-cluster as-
signments are public, and so the adversary can use them
to perform this deanonymization.
For our attack, we suppose the adversary employs a
variant of the Chosen Destination Attack [36] in which
the client repeatedly connects to a malicious website
over a longer timescale. The adversary runs a number
of web servers hosted in different ASes and includes
resources from each server in the website. Each time
the client connects to the site, the adversary uses his
servers, in conjunction with a guard discovery attack
[22, 45], to observe the client’s circuit-construction be-
havior. As demonstrated against Astoria, these obser-
vations can identify the client’s representative location
and thus his cluster. After the adversary determines
a client’s clusters (C1, . . . , Cn) across n cluster forma-
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Fig. 6. Anonymity set sizes of possible client ASes in TAPS after
n cluster formations.
tions, then the adversary knows the client’s AS is in
the set
⋂n
i=1 Ci. As cluster composition varies across
reformations, the client’s AS can eventually be revealed
(Section 4 describes how revealing the AS degrades the
client’s anonymity).
Methodology. We measure this degradation by
running the TAPS clustering routine on archived Tor
and Internet routing data. We implement TAPS (specif-
ically, the TrustAll configuration with The Man trust
policy) to conservatively evaluate how it is affected by
network changes. In particular, we omit AS organiza-
tions, IXPs, and IXP organizations as possible sources
of compromise, and we use a fixed prefix-to-AS mapping
at all times. These choices should make our anonymity
analysis conservative, as anonymity degrades faster the
more that the composition of TAPS clusters changes
across cluster reformations. By implementing TAPS to
use fewer data sources and more static data, we expect
that the clusters generated by TAPS vary less in com-
position across reformations.
We perform twelve TAPS cluster formations — one
for every month in 2016. We use CAIDA’s serial-2 AS re-
lationships and CollecTor’s Tor data for each respective
month, and a fixed Route Views prefix-to-AS mapping
set from Jan 2016 for each clustering. Following John-
son et al. [36], we use the top Tor client ASes identified
by Juen [39] as medoid centers and configure TAPS to
generate 200 client clusters. We verify that our TAPS
implementation is deterministic on input (i.e. changes
in AS-cluster assignments are driven by changes in net-
work data, and not by some use of randomness within
the clustering algorithm).
We identify a set of 50,388 stable ASes, that is, those
that exist in all twelve clusterings (ASes are only clus-
tered if they exist in the CAIDA relationship data set for
that month). We measure the anonymity-set size of each
of these stable ASes after a variable number n of consec-
utive cluster formations; namely, |⋂ni=1 Ci(AS)| where Ci
maps an AS to the ASes in its cluster in month i.
Results. Figure 6 plots distributions of anonymity-
set sizes. Each CDF corresponds to the distribution af-
ter n consecutive cluster formations. The (n = 1) CDF
shows the anonymity-set-size distribution after the ini-
tial clustering in Jan, (n = 2) shows the distribution
after cluster formations in Jan and Feb, etc. Each point
on a CDF corresponds to the anonymity-set size for one
of the 50,388 client ASes.
TAPS cluster reformations have serious conse-
quences with respect to user anonymity. Initially (n =
1), the TAPS clustering assignment does well at produc-
ing large clusters with similar sizes: the 5th, 50th, and
95th percentiles are all of the same order of magnitude
with sizes of 103, 445, and 927 ASes, respectively. How-
ever, just a single reformation can harm large fractions
of users. After just a single reformation in Feb (n = 2),
we observe a 94% reduction in anonymity-set size, from
445 to 28 ASes, for the median client AS, and a 99% re-
duction in size from 154 to 2 ASes at the 10th percentile.
By six total clusterings, (n = 6), 49% of ASes are left
with singleton anonymity sets. Clients from any one of
these ASes in this near-majority are rendered identifi-
able to their AS by their circuit-construction patterns
over time. By being patient and exploiting this tempo-
ral vulnerability in TAPS, the adversary can learn many
clients’ locations.
7.2 HORNET
Protocol. Refer to Section 5.4 for a more complete
description of the HORNET protocol. The important
properties of the protocol to recall are: (1) HORNET
provides anonymity at the network layer; (2) the identi-
ties of the source and destination hosts of a connection
are hidden from all ASes carrying the connection’s traf-
fic except the source and destination ASes, respectively;
and (3) ASes learn their immediate predecessor and suc-
cessor ASes on a connection’s path.
Attack. For this Tempest attack, we observe that
network routes can change over time and that such
changes can leak information about the client location.
Consider a compromised AS A that observes a connec-
tion to a destination server within A. The adversary
observes the penultimate AS hop X of this connection.
Thus, the adversary knows that the client’s location is
in the set S0 containing all ASes that currently have
a route to A with penultimate hop X. Now, suppose a
route change occurs that causes the client to reconnect
through penultimate AS hop Y . We assume that the
adversary can link the reconnection to the prior con-
nection via traffic analysis (e.g. the destination typi-
cally has only one active connection or a higher-level
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protocol has an identifiable handshake pattern at con-
nection start). The adversary can then compute the set
S1 containing ASes that route to A through penulti-
mate hop Y and conclude that the client’s AS is within
S0∩S1. Thus, as with the previous attack (Section 7.1),
the client’s anonymity is degraded by learning its AS.
To run this attack, the adversary (1) controls an AS
A, (2) monitors connections to a third-party destination
host within A, and (3) waits for route changes to occur
that affect the connections he is monitoring. The adver-
sary must also have some source of data about the avail-
able routes to A, several of which are currently available,
including public routing datasets [64] and public plat-
forms for traceroute measurements [54]. We assess the
risk this attack poses by quantifying the frequency of
naturally-occurring route changes and the impact that
a single change can have on anonymity.
Methodology. We use traceroute data made avail-
able by RIPE Atlas [54] to analyze Internet routing
changes. RIPE Atlas is an Internet measurement plat-
form consisting of thousands of volunteer-run network
probes. These probes are distributed across thousands of
different networks and can be configured to run various
Internet measurements, such as pings and traceroutes.
We consider one such Internet measurement (id
= 5001); in this measurement, all online probes run
UDP traceroutes to k.root-servers.net. In Jan–Feb 2016,
the period we consider for this study, this name resolved
to 193.0.14.129 in AS25152. There were approximately
8,500 probes hosted across 5,700 IP prefixes, representa-
tive of 10–11% of allocatable IPv4 space, running tracer-
outes to this destination every 30 minutes. For the sake
of this analysis, we consider the scenario where AS25152
is under adversarial control and contains a destination
host of interest to the adversary.
We identify a set of stable probes whose IP prefix
and AS of origin do not change during our measure-
ment period; we want to ensure that route changes that
we observe are due to changes in network routes and
not “artificially” induced by a probe’s physical location
changing. We identify 6,566 stable probes hosted across
2,726 unique ASes. These probes will serve as the clients
our adversary will attempt to deanonymize.
Frequency of Changes. We use Route Views prefix-
to-AS mappings to compute the AS path each probe
uses to reach AS25152. At the granularity of the mea-
surement interval (30 minutes), we search for route
changes that cause a change in a stable probe’s penul-
timate hop to AS25152 between two traceroutes. We
perform this search for all stable probes over the en-
tire month-long period. We compute the mean number
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Fig. 7. Mean anonymity set sizes for ASes before and after a
route change occurs in HORNET.
of penultimate hop changes each AS experiences from
Jan–Feb (averaging over probes).
Impact of Changes. For each route change we iden-
tify in a stable probe p’s traceroute data, we com-
pute two sets: S0, containing all probes with traceroutes
matching p’s penultimate hop before the route change
occurred, and S1, containing all probes with traceroutes
p’s penultimate hop after the route change occurred. We
then measure p’s anonymity set size with respect to S0
and S0 ∩ S1 (i.e. before and after the route change) by
computing |{A(p) | p ∈ S0}| and |{A(p) | p ∈ S0 ∩ S1}|,
where A maps a probe to its Autonomous System of
origin. Following this method, we compute the mean
before-and-after anonymity set sizes for each AS with
at least one route change by averaging over all route
changes and stable probes.
Results. Frequency of Changes. We find that 840
(30%) of the 2,726 ASes experience at least one penul-
timate hop route change from Jan–Feb and that the
distribution of changes is long-tailed. 20% of ASes ex-
perience at least 2 penultimate hop changes on average,
10% of ASes experience at least 3.8 changes, 5% of ASes
experience at least 7.9 changes, and 3% of ASes experi-
ences at least 50.8 changes. ASes that had at least one
route change are susceptible to this attack. Frequent
route changes can further expose users both by increas-
ing the probability that an adversary can make at least
one route change observation for a user and by intro-
ducing the possibility that multiple route changes can
be linked to a single user. Our results are limited to lo-
cations with probes, but, due to the large sample-size of
probes, the distribution of frequencies we obtain should
apply to the Internet as a whole.
Impact of Changes. Figure 7 depicts the distribu-
tion of mean anonymity set sizes for each of the 840
ASes with at least one change before and after a single,
average routing change occurs. A nontrivial percentage
of these ASes (8%) are left with singleton anonymity
sets after the average route change. There is a sizable
reduction in anonymity for most ASes; for example,
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the median shifts from an anonymity set size of 170
ASes to just 8 ASes. The anonymity sets formed in
this analysis are limited to locations with probe cover-
age. This particularly affects the absolute anonymity-set
sizes. However, we expect that the relative reductions in
anonymity (e.g. an order of magnitude) reflect an ad-
versary’s ability in practice.
These results present a serious risk for users. Sup-
pose that the destination under surveillance in AS25152
serves c live client connections on average at any given
time and suppose that users are distributed roughly uni-
formly across the Internet AS space. From our analysis
above, we would expect that 0.3c connections will ex-
perience a penultimate hop route over the month (see
Frequency results, we found that 30% of source ASes
experienced a penult. hop change). If the destination is
popular or connections are long-lived, c will be large and
thus many users will be vulnerable to this attack.
7.3 Summary
For both TAPS and HORNET, we show that a pa-
tient adversary who waits for network changes (clus-
ter reformations in TAPS, route changes in HORNET)
can use public datasets (cluster assignments, tracer-
oute data) to achieve order-of-magnitude reductions in
clients’ anonymity set sizes. As the network continues
to change, clients ASes can be completely identified.
8 Discussion and Ethics
Countermeasure Challenges. Explicitly accounting
for temporal dynamics could reduce the severity of the
Tempest attacks. However, the most straightforward de-
fenses encounter subtle tradeoffs and weaknesses. For
example, an obvious approach to defending against
the client-mobility attacks on vanilla Tor and Counter-
RAPTOR is for the client to select multiple guards in
different locations and use the one closest to current
location. However, this raises an immediate tradeoff be-
tween defending against Tempest and limiting the num-
ber of potentially malicious relays in the guard position.
This approach also raises the possibility of an attack in
which an adversary places guards in targeted locations
to affect nearby clients. As another example, a natural
attempt to prevent the user-behavior attack on Dove-
tail would be for each client to choose a small number
of matchmakers to use for all connections. However, as
noted by Sankey and Wright (Section 5.1 [56]), reusing
the same matchmaker gives it the ability to perform
an intersection attack across connections based on their
tail segments, as the client chooses each tail segment
to minimize intersections with the head path. As a fi-
nal example, a plausible defense against the routing-
change attack on HORNET might seem to be for the
client to choose paths for which the penultimate hop
changes infrequently. However, in addition to making a
client’s anonymity dependent on routing dynamics out-
side of its control, this creates an additional information
leak to the adversary, who could take into account path
variability when considering which client location is a
likely source for an observed connection. Thus defending
against the Tempest attacks appears to be a non-trivial
challenge that we leave for future work.
Active Attacks. In this paper, we mainly consider
adversaries passively observing network traffic. How-
ever, we do consider an adversary performing active
BGP hijacks against Counter-RAPTOR in Section 5.3
and Appendix B.1, and we do include active methods
among those that might be used to link connections and
perform guard discovery. We leave for future work a
more general analysis of the power of active adversaries
to exploit temporal dynamics. Such adversaries could
be very powerful. For instance, an active adversary may
be able to track the movements of a Vanilla Tor client
by continually intercepting traffic to the guard. As an-
other example, an active adversary may cause observ-
able routing changes by withdrawing and inserting (pos-
sibly completely legitimate) routes in HORNET.
Ethical Considerations. All the datasets we used
in this paper were publicly available. With the privacy
and safety of Tor users in mind, we refrain from collect-
ing any user data on the live Tor network. Instead, we
work with existing public datasets, such as network data
from CAIDA and RIPE Atlas, Tor data from CollecTor,
and location data from Gowalla and Foursquare, to per-
form attack analysis while preserving the anonymity of
real Tor users. The code used for this paper is available
at https://github.com/rwails/tempest for review.
9 Related Work
Temporal Dynamics. Similar to our work, there is a
thread of research that deals with the degradation of
anonymity over a period of time. In the predecessor at-
tack [53, 65], an attacker tracks users’ communications
over multiple path reformulations and identifies the ob-
served previous hops as the most likely sources of the
connection. Øverlier and Syverson [51] used similar ob-
servations for demonstrating practical attacks against
hidden services, and motivated the use of and research
on guard relays in anonymity networks [21, 27]. Intersec-
tion attacks [5, 52] and disclosure attacks [16, 17, 41, 44]
aim to compromise client anonymity by intersecting
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over time the sets of clients that were active when a
given client is observed to receive a message. Danezis
and Troncoso highlighted the impact of evolution of user
behavior in disclosure attacks [18].
In contrast to previous works, we identify and an-
alyze novel traffic analysis attacks based on exploiting
temporal changes in anonymity paths, specifically in the
context of low-latency anonymity systems and AS-level
adversaries. We note that our results on client mobility
represent the first analysis of this issue in anonymity
systems. Furthermore, our results on exploiting user be-
havior and routing updates represent the first analysis
of how probabilistic information leaks due to restricted
AS-level Internet topology can be aggregated over time.
Our work is also unique in systematically investigating
these issues across a broad range of systems.
Network-Level Adversaries. Security analyses
of anonymity systems typically focus on the threat
of end-to-end timing correlation by compromised or
malicious relays/proxies [26]. Feamster and Dingledine
were the first to consider this threat from the per-
spective of network-level adversaries [23]. Murdoch and
Zieliński [48] showed that even Internet-exchange level
adversaries can perform traffic analysis of anonymity
systems. Edman and Syverson [20] measured the impact
of Tor’s path selection strategies on security against
network-level adversaries. Johnson et al. [38] performed
a security analysis of Tor and measured the risk of
deanonymization against both relay-level and network-
level adversaries over time. Sun et al. [59] were the first
to observe that an adversary could manipulate rout-
ing dynamics (BGP) to compromise user anonymity in
Tor, including exploiting inherent churn in BGP. These
works have motivated the design of several of the sys-
tems we study in this paper, and our work shows that
that the deanonymization risk in those systems is much
greater than previously thought.
Latency Attacks. Hopper et al. [30] demonstrated
that a malicious destination can infer a client’s location
after a number of repeated connections using informa-
tion leaked via connection latency in Tor. Latency at-
tacks are orthogonal to Tempest attacks and can be
used in parallel to enhance the adversary’s ability to
deanonymize users. However, Tempest attacks are ap-
plicable in cases where latency attacks may be ineffec-
tive, e.g. in source-controlled routing networks where
the availability of many routable Internet paths may
limit information leaks from latency.
Other Traffic Analysis Attacks. Our work high-
lights the risk of abstracting away important system
components that impact user anonymity in practice.
Similarly, prior work on traffic analysis has considered
a range of related oversights. Mittal et al. [45] ana-
lyzed the impact of network throughput information,
and showed that it allows an adversary to infer the iden-
tities of Tor relays in a circuit. Murdoch and Danezis [47]
and Evans et al. [22] considered the impact of network
congestion on anonymity systems such as Tor. Borisov
et al. [7] and Jansen et al. [35] explored the use of de-
nial of service attacks to compromise client anonymity.
Murdoch [46] and Zander et al. [68] have shown that
clock skew can be used for deanonymization.
10 Conclusion
We identify temporal dynamics in anonymity paths
as potentially degrading the security of anonymous-
communication systems. We present the Tempest at-
tacks, which make novel use of such dynamics in three
broad categories, including path changes due to client
mobility, user behavior, and network routing updates.
These attacks are shown to be effective against a vari-
ety of anonymity systems including both onion-routing
and network-layer protocols. Our work leads to the fol-
lowing recommendations for the research community:
Adversarial Model: Anonymity systems should
consider the threat of a patient adversary that is inter-
ested in performing long-term attacks on anonymity sys-
tems. Such an adversary can record information about
user communications over a long period of time, and
then (1) aggregate probabilistic information leaks over
time to deanonymize users, and (2) correlate informa-
tion leaks with auxiliary sources of information, such as
data about client mobility patterns or network routing
updates, to deanonymize users.
Temporal Dynamics: Anonymity systems should
be analyzed for use over time. In particular, system de-
signers ought to consider the effects client mobility, user
behavior, and network routing changes. More generally,
our work motivates (1) the design of anonymity proto-
cols that are robust in the presence of temporal dynam-
ics, and (2) the formalization of security definitions and
frameworks that incorporate relevant temporal issues.
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A Client Mobility
A.1 DeNASA
Protocol. Refer to Section 6.1’s protocol descrip-
tion; briefly restated, DeNASA clients who use g-select
choose guards only from among relays that are suspect-
free; i.e. clients ensure two suspect ASes do not exist on
their client-guard network paths.
Attack. In the similar manner as the attack we
outline in Section 5.2, we consider the risk of traffic-
correlation by one of the suspect ASes as clients move
between network locations. Although the client initially
chooses a suspect-free guard, the client may introduce
one of the suspect ASes onto his client-guard network
path as he moves to new locations while continuing to
use the same guard.
Methodology. We quantify the increasing prob-
ability that the suspect ASes will be able to observe
client-guard connections during clients’ movements. We
simulate mobile clients following our mobility model in
Section 4. Using guard weights, we compute the prob-
ability that a client will choose a guard such that the
client-guard link is compromised by a suspect AS at
least once over the client’s movements. We compute
this compromise probability for each client in both the
Foursquare and Gowalla dataset.
Result. Figure 8 shows the distribution of clients’
probability of compromise, where clients are grouped
together by their number of country-level movements.
Each point on the line shows the median probability of
compromise over clients with a given number of country-
level movements. The shaded area shows values be-
tween [Q1 − 1.5 IQR, Q3 + 1.5 IQR], where Q1 and Q3
are Quartile 1 and Quartile 3, respectively, and IQR,
the interquartile range, is defined as Q3 −Q1. Initially,
all clients are able to find suspect-free guards, and so
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Fig. 8. Probability of compromising client-guard connec-
tions for suspect ASes in DeNASA. The line shows the me-
dian probability and the shaded area shows values within
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dataset.
clients with no movements have no probability of being
compromised. Once the clients start moving to different
countries, the probability increases. There is large vari-
ance in probabilities among clients when the number of
country-level movements is relatively small (8 or fewer
countries for Gowalla users and 10 or fewer countries
for Foursquare users) — for some clients, the probabil-
ity remains close to 0, while for others it can get close to
1 after visiting only six countries in both datasets. The
rate of increase in probability depends on the countries
that a client visits and the order of the visits.
A.2 HORNET Supplemental
In Section 5.4, we present the accuracy rates for des-
tination Fastly (AS54113) with 80% and 90% rejection
rates. We have also performed the same evaluations with
respect to Google (AS15169), Facebook (AS32934) and
Twitter (AS13414). We show the results (with 90% re-
jection rate) in Figure 9 based on the Gowalla dataset.
We can see that the overall trends are similar for all
four ASes — the accuracy rate quickly increases with
the number of location data points. For both Facebook
and Twitter, the accuracy rates reach 100% when there
are at least 225 location data points. For Google, the ac-
curacy rate reaches 100% when number of location data
points reaches 250, however, it goes back down to 87.5%
when considering only clients with 300 location data
points or more. This could be due to the limited num-
ber of clients in the 300-data-point group which leads
to lower accuracy rate.
B User Behavior
B.1 Counter-RAPTOR
Protocol. Recall from Section 5.3 that Counter-
RAPTOR is another proposed client-location-aware
modification to Tor’s guard selection. In Counter-
RAPTOR, clients incorporate a BGP hijack resilience
value into guard selection probabilities.
Attack. Guard resiliency varies across client loca-
tions; a guard may be resilient to hijacks with respect
to some client locations but not others. As such, in the
same manner as DeNASA, guard selections that can be
linked to a client by the adversary can be used to infer
the client’s location. Counter-RAPTOR does offer some
defense against this attack; to prevent relay load from
becoming too skewed by resilience values and to limit
location information leakage, Counter-RAPTOR clients
weight guards by a configurable linear blend of resilience
and bandwidth weight. We run the same Tempest at-
tack described in Section 6.1 to evaluate the efficacy of
the Section 6.1 Tempest attack on Counter-RAPTOR.
Methodology. We implement Counter-RAPTOR
using archived Tor and Internet topology data. We ad-
here to the adversary model and methodology laid out
in Section 6.1, with a caveat that we use older Tor
data from Oct 2015 for this analysis, but AS topol-
ogy data derived from CAIDA’s Oct 2016 datasets. We
do not expect that this inconsistency in methodology
significantly affects our results. We configure Counter-
RAPTOR with configuration parameter α = 0.5, i.e.,
clients weight guards 50% by their resilience value and
50% by their bandwidth. α = 0.5 is the default value rec-
ommended by Sun et al. [58]. We compute the Counter-
RAPTOR guard selection distributions for all clients lo-
cations in a fully-connected component of 55,243 ASes.
We perform a search for leaky client locations
among the 55,243 ASes using the heuristic search tech-
niques described in Section 6.1. In total, we select the
top 18 ASes from our search heuristics for evaluation.
We perform 100 simulations from each of these 18 lo-
cations of a client selecting up to 500 guards. In each
simulation, we form a posterior distribution over client
locations after each guard selection, assuming a uniform
prior.
Results. Figure 10 shows the entropy of this pos-
terior client location probability distribution, averaged
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Fig. 10. Mean entropy of posterior client-AS distribution of
Counter-RAPTOR clients in “leaky” ASes over multiple guard
observations.
across samples, for each client AS at varying number of
guard observations. For visual clarity, we only include
the five ASes whose samples had the smallest mean en-
tropy after 100 guard selections. Guard selections from
the leakiest ASes we evaluated for Counter-RAPTOR
are not nearly as informative as we found in DeNASA.
After 100 guard selections, clients in AS6185 are the
worst off, but only have lost 7.44 bits of entropy on av-
erage. Clients do leak significant amounts of information
over hundreds of guard selections, e.g. clients in AS174
have 1.1 bits of entropy on average after 500 guard se-
lections; however, it is very unlikely that a client will
need to select this many guards and so the slow leakage
may be acceptable for most users. Though our search
methods are not exhaustive, these results suggest that
Counter-RAPTOR’s bandwidth blending may be a suit-
able method for limiting location information leaks in
location-aware relay selection algorithms.
B.2 PHI
Protocol. PHI, short for Path-Hidden Lightweight
Anonymity Protocol, is a network-layer anonymity pro-
tocol that protects users by using encrypted routing
state stored in packet headers and by using path-setup
traffic indirection in a similar fashion to Dovetail. PHI’s
design improves upon two of Dovetail’s shortcomings:
(1) PHI uses fixed-size packet headers and randomized
placement of routing state within packet headers to pre-
vent ASes from learning their absolute positions on a
path, and (2) PHI offers compatibility with BGP net-
works and does not require an infrastructure that sup-
ports source-controlled routing.
In PHI, helper ASes serve an analogous role to Dove-
tail’s matchmaker ASes. A source host S builds a con-
nection to a destination D using two half-paths to and
from a helper AS H which is chosen from a set of avail-
able helpers. The process of setting up the first half-path
from S to H reveals H as the helper AS to all interme-
diate ASes on the S ; H half path, but S’s identity is
hidden from all but the source AS, as the route back to
S is stored as encrypted segments in the setup-packet
headers. S uses the half-path to send to H the final des-
tination D encrypted using the public key of H, and
then H runs a back-off procedure to identify a midway
AS M who serves a similar role to Dovetail’s dovetail
AS. The back-off procedure will choose the midway to
be the last AS on the S ; M path who can transit
traffic from his predecessor AS to D without violating
any valley-free routing assumptions. M builds the sec-
ond half-path M ; D establishing the final end-to-end
path S ; M ; D. So, ASes on a PHI path learn (1)
the identities of their immediate predecessor and suc-
cessor ASes on the path, (2) their relative position on
path (i.e. before the midway, the midway, or after the
midway), and (3) the host/AS at the end of their half-
path (ASes on S ; H learn H’s identity, ASes on on
M ; D learn D’s identity).
Attack. We run a modification of our Section 6.2
Tempest attack on PHI. In this attack, the adver-
sary compromises a single, fixed AS and attempts to
deanonymize a client who is repeatedly connecting to a
fixed destination using many helper nodes. Path usage
leaks location information in PHI just as it does in Dove-
tail and so the adversary, when having compromised an
AS on a client’s path, can use the topological informa-
tion he learns to infer the client’s location. When the
adversary is on the M ; D half-path (and therefore
knows D’s identity), we suppose the adversary can link
the connection and his observation to the client using
one of the linking techniques described in Section 4.
We codify the adversary’s observations, notated as
O, as triplets containing (1) the adversary’s predecessor
AS in the path, (2) the adversary’s relative position on
path, and (3) the AS containing D. Having made obser-
vations (O1, . . . , On) the adversary computes posterior
probability Pr(L | O1, . . . , On) for each possible client
location L, assuming a uniform prior. Unlike Dovetail,
computing observation likelihoods in PHI is not pro-
hibitive and so we favor a probabilistic approach; how-
ever, we conservatively assume the adversary does not
know how often non-observations occur, i.e. when the
client makes a connection not containing the compro-
mised AS. Because of our conservative approach, the
adversary may incorrectly compute some observation
likelihoods, leading to an incorrect posterior, and so we
cannot accurately use entropy to measure anonymity.
Instead, we use the adversary’s posterior probabilities
as guessing scores and use accuracy and rejection rates
to measure attack efficacy, similar to our Section 5.4
HORNET mobility attack.
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Methodology. We run our Tempest attack in a
simulated PHI network according to the protocol de-
scription above. This simulation is performed on a well-
connected AS graph containing 55,244 ASes. The graph
is generated using shortest-path, valley-free inference
using CAIDA’s AS relationships.
We note that Chen et al. suggest that PHI clients
select helper ASes for a connection by attempting to
maximize source-anonymity-set sizes with respect to the
connection’s midway node; however, for two reasons, we
do not implement this helper selection scheme. First, in
that proposal, it is also suggested that clients only use
subsets of helper ASes when maximizing anonymity-set
sizes to prevent an adversary from learning too much
by observing a client’s helper selection, but it is un-
specified how clients choose appropriate helper subsets.
Second, the method of anonymity-set computation used
in PHI does not properly model an adversary who can
reason about the actions of clients. Suppose that, in
some path, midway AS M observes predecessor AS P .
PHI describes a possibilistic method for anonymity-set
computation, in which M would include any AS with
a valley-free path to P in the source’s anonymity set;
however, if, for example, all but a few source ASes use
P with negligible probability, an adversary may be able
to determine the source’s AS confidently by way of sta-
tistical inference. Correctly maximizing anonymity-set
sizes through helper selections in the presence of this
adversary (without leaking additional topological infor-
mation) is a non-trivial task and outside the scope of
this work.
Midway Frequency. To choose a compromised AS for
this attack, we identify ASes likely to be chosen as the
midway in PHI connections. The midway is the closest
on-path AS to the source who learns the destination of
the connection, and so ASes who frequently serve as the
midway are well-positioned to run our linking attack.
We draw (source, helper, destination) AS triples uni-
formly at random from our network and build a connec-
tion from the source to the destination via the helper,
recording which AS is selected to serve as the midway.
We repeat this sampling 10,000 times.
Anonymity Evaluation. We run simulations to mea-
sure how much a single compromised AS can learn in
the repeated-connections setting. For each simulation,
we (uniformly at random) sample a source AS, a desti-
nation AS, and 500 ASes to serve as helper nodes. We
simulate multiple PHI connections from the source to
destination — for each connection, the source chooses
a helper uniformly at random (with replacement) from
among the 500 available to him. If the connection passes
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Fig. 11. Accuracy of deanonymization in PHI after a client makes
x repeated connections for various rejection rates (R.R.) with
respect to adversarial AS174.
through the compromised AS such that the compro-
mised AS learns the destination, we compute the (possi-
bly incorrect) likelihoods that this connection was cre-
ated by a client in each of the 55,244 possible source
ASes. For each observable connection, we use these like-
lihoods to update the adversary’s belief about the loca-
tion of the client (maintained persistently for the entire
simulation). The adversary starts with a uniform prior
belief over all possible source ASes in each simulation.
For a single simulation, we consider up to 50 repeated
connections from the sampled source to destination. We
repeat this entire simulation procedure 1,000 times.
Results. Midway Frequency. AS174 (Cogent) is
most frequently selected, serving as the midway in 7.9%
of all connections; so, we use AS174 as our compromised
AS for this attack.
Anonymity Evaluation. Figure 11 plots the
deanonymization accuracy the adversary can achieve
after the client makes some number of repeated con-
nections at various rejection rates. For example, the
point at (x = 30, y = 0.35) in the 75% rejection rate
line indicates that after the client made 30 repeated
connections, the adversary could determine the client’s
location in 25% of samples with 35% accuracy (the
adversary makes no guess due to lack of confidence in
the other 75% of samples).
We find that PHI exhibits weaknesses to our Tem-
pest attack. As a client continues to make connections
through the network, the adversary’s ability to correctly
determine the client’s location grows significantly. When
the adversary is willing to guess for 10% of samples (i.e.
at a 90% rejection rate), he only achieves 13% accuracy
after a single connection; however, by 30 repeated con-
nections, accuracy increases significantly to 73%. If the
adversary wishes to avoid incorrect guesses, he can tune
his guessing threshold to 99% rejection and can achieve
100% accuracy after just 2 repeated client connections.
